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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CLARENCE 'VOODARD and 
INNA WOODARD, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JESSE R. ALLEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE NO. 8031 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as set forth in the appellant's 
brief is substantially correct, but the respondent desires 
to call particular attention to some matters of evidence. 
Fred Gagan, the appellant's real estate agent, repre-
sented to Mr. Allen that in the event of a sale the 
vVoodards would get into their car and drive off, mean-
ing that every thing except personal belongings and the 
automobile would go with the same. However, Mr. Wood-
ard reserved a hay baler (Tr. 50-51). Mr. Gagan, in 
effect, made the same statement to Mr. Allen and Mr. 
Hall before the con tract was signed. Mr. Hall testified 
that Mr. Gagan stated that "Everything goes," except 
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a hay haler and some hand tools (Tr. 76). Mr. Allen 
tm;tified that when the contract was signed Mr. Gagan, 
referring to the li'St of personal property made a part 
of the contract of sale, said:. 
''This just lists the principal part of the machin-
ery, but everything goes" (Tr. 53). 
Instead of all the personal property except person£tl 
belongings, the automobile, the hay baler and hand tools 
going with the deal, it subsequently developed that at 
least the following were either to be retained by Mr. 
'Voodard or did not belong to him: 
A two-wheel trailer and cutter (Tr. 55), 
Cement mixer, leveler and hayrack (Tr. 56), 
.:\Iilking machine and scales ( Tr. 7 4). 
Hay and grain (Tr. 78). 
The farm was represented by Mr. Gagan to Mr. 
Allen as containing 170 acres of land under cultivation 
(Tr. 18, 20, 21, 2:2, 23, 24, 42, 43, 51, 57, 58, 77). There 
were only 108 acres of land under cultivation (Tr. 57). 
Mr. Woodard and ~Ir. Allen canceled and rescinded 
the contract (Tr. 58, 59, 89, 90, 92). After :Mr. Woodard 
and :Mr. Allen rescinded the contract Mr. Woodard 
solicited Mr. Hall to find a purchaser for the property 
(Tr. 59), and Mr. Hall thereafter, at Mr. Woodard's 
request, attempted to interest two prospective buyers 
in the property (Tr. 79, 80). :Mr. Rawlings and his 
brother were taken to the property by Ira Gagan, who 
attempted to sell· the property to them. Mr. Woodard 
participated in the conversations at the Woodard farm 
with Mr. Rawlings, his brother and Ira Gagan (Tr. 83, 
84, 87, 88). 
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The representations concerning the amount of land 
under cultivation and the real property to be sold were 
largely Inade by Fred Gagan, 'Yoodards' real estate 
agent, and not by :Jh;._ "~ oodard (Tr. 74). However, Mr. 
Allen discussed the matter with Mr. Woodard, who con-
firmed the representations n1ade by Gagan (Tr. 74). 
The appellant has chosen to argue his case under 
three points: 
1. That the evidence and testiinony received was 
insufficient to justify the decree rendered. 
2. The decision of the trial Court was contrary 
to law and the rulef? of equity. 
3. That the trial court erred in denying plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. 
The third point is covered by the first two and will 
not require separate treatment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The re·spondent will present his case under two 
points: 
1. The evidence was sufficient to justify the 
decree rendered. 
2. The decree of the trial Court was not contrary 
to law and is the correct decision under the 
rules of equity. 
In addition, the respondent asserts that the Court 
was in error in failing to find in respondent's favor in 
the following particulars : 
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STATI~l\1:ENT OF CROSS ERRORS 
3. That the trial Court was in error in failing to 
make findings in favor of the respondent upon the allega-
tion or the defendant's answer that the plaintiff repre-
sented to the defendant or that the respondent believed 
that the farm contained 170 acres of cultivated land 
instead of 108 acres and in failing to find that the per-
sonal property repre~ented to be included in the trans-
action was not all included therein and in failing to make 
and enter conclusions of law and decree in favor of the 
defendant in the exercise of a sound discretion because 
of such representations. 
ARGU~lENT 
POINT O~E 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE 
DECREE RENDERED. 
When the case was first called for trial the defendant 
was granted leave of Court to amend the defendant's 
answer to set up as an affirmative defense that the plain-
tiffs are not the owners of a marketable title to the 
premises involved in this action. Thereupon the plaintiffs 
moved that the trial be continued to allow them time to 
meet the matter set up in the said affirmative defense. 
At that time the plaintiffs were informed that the 
defendant relied upon the fact that the title to the 
plaintiffs' property came through tax titles, which are not 
marketable. The Court granted the motion to continue and 
the case subsequently came on for trial. Plaintiffs offered 
in evidence the abstract of title to the premises to be 
sold and the files of the District Court of Duchesne 
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County, CiYil Nluubers 1974, 1975, 1976 and 2017. These 
files were actions to quiet title upon the tax deeds in 
the chain of title. At the tin1e the files were introduced 
the Court asked if there was any objection to their intro-
duction and the defendant'~ counsel ,stated that he would 
check the files to determine whether or not the affidavits 
in support of the orders of publication of summons 
were sufficient and for any other matters which would 
affect the sufficiency of the actions. After the case was 
submitted the trial Court asked for briefs on the matter 
and the question of the sufficiency of the affidavits ia 
support of the orders of publication of summons was 
discussed therein. 
Appellant contends that the Court made no specific 
findings as to any defect in plaintiffs' chain of title. 
The Court found that in the chain of title to several 
parcels totaling 240 acres of plaintiffs' lands and form-
ing necessary links in the chain of title to each parcel 
was a tax deed and that the actions to quiet title upon said 
tax deeds, files numbers 197 4, 1975 and 1976 were 
ineffective. Appellant also contends that the abstract 
of title introduced by plaintiffs shows a fee simple title 
in Clarence Woodard with no defects or omissions in the 
chain of title. Files numbers 1974, 1975, 1976 and 2017 
were introduced by plaintiffs to establish that quiet 
title actions had been brought on the tax deeds in the 
chains of title. Appellant impliedly admitted by the 
introduction of said files that his title, without said 
suits to quiet title, is not marketable-else why did he 
introduce said files~ 
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An examination of these files will dif.;close that under 
the ruling of this Court in the recent case of Bowen v. 
Olson, ____________ Utah ____________ ; 246 Pac. (2d) 602, the affi-
davits for publication of summons are wholly insufficient 
to give the Court jurisdiction of the defendants in those 
actions. For example, in ease number 197 4 the only alle-
gation as to diligence used in locating Jesse E. Tripp and 
Mrs. Jesse E. Tripp, two defendants in that action, is 
as follows: 
"That the defendants Jesse E. Tripp and Mrs. 
Jesse E. Tripp, his wife, cannot be found within 
the State of Utah; and so far as is known by 
plaintiff they have moYed from said State; that 
they cannot, after due diligence, be found within 
said State of Utah. That plaintiff has used due 
diligence in trying to locate said defendants but 
has failed to locate their address or where-
abouts.'' 
The affidavit in case number 1975 is no better and 
is practically a repetition of the allegation just quoted. 
The affidavit in case Number 1976 is practically the 
same. 
In the case of Bowen v. Olson, supra, much more 
material of an evidentiary nature was set forth in the 
affidavit in support of publication of summons than in 
said cases, files numbers 197 4, 1975 and 1976. In that 
case the Court held that where the affidavit in support 
of the order of publication of summons does not contain 
sufficient facts from which a judge or clerk could satisfy 
himself that the requirements of the statute as to dili-
gence in ascertaining the place of residence of the de-
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fendants had been n1et, the publication did not effect a 
service on the defendant and the judgment was void on 
its face for lack of jurisdiction. As Justice Wade, in 
writing the main opinion in Bowen v. Olson, said: 
·'It is a basic rule that judgment is void and 
subject to collateral :attack if a lack of jurisdi0-
tion in the Court appears on the face of the 
record. • "' *. 
•' The affidavit for publication having failed to 
reveal any facts at all from which a judge or 
clerk could satisfy himself that the requirements 
of the statute had been met, the publication did 
not effect service on the appellant and the judg-
ment was void on its face for lack of jurisdiction 
in the Court.'' 
A title to real property which must depend upon a 
tax deed is not marketable because examining attorneys 
will not accept such. The actions to quiet title upon 
the tax deeds being void, the Court properly found that 
plaintiff,s' title to the parcels covered by the aforesaid 
actions was not marketable. There is ample evidence in 
the exhibits introduced by the appellant to support the 
finding that plaintiffs' title to a portion of the real 
property was not marketable. 
Appellants further argue that" the abstract of title 
discloses they have held title and possession for over 
seven years, peaceably and quietly and without threat of 
litigation. The abstract does not disclose such facts. If 
such facts exist they are matters to be proved. They do 
not appear in the abstract. Only litigation can establish 
the truth or falsity of such allegations. And thus the 
title is not marketable. 
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As the Court said in Winston v. Gilstrap, 147 Or. 
374; 32 Pac. (2d) 769: 
"As said in Lockhart v. Ferrey, supra, at page 
183 of 59 Or. 115, 115 Pac. 431, 433 a "market-
able title" means one appearing 'to be such by 
the record of conveyances or other public 
memorial. It means that the title must appear 
of record, and not rest in parol.'' 
In the case of Stewart-Livestock Company v. Ostler, 
105 Utah 529; 144 Pac. (2d) ~76 this Court said: 
''The allegation that Ostler might have acquired 
title by adverse possession by paying taxes for 
seven consecutive years is not a defense to the 
plea of breach of contract of sale, for title 
acquired by adverse possession through acts of 
the grantee is not a defense to the plea of 
breach of contract of sale, for title acquired by 
adverse possession through acts of the grantee 
is not a compliance on the part of a grantor with 
a covenant to 'perfect the title.' Furthermore, 
the mere fact that the grantee might actually 
prevail in litigation against any other person 
would not satisfy the requirement that the 
grantor convey a ma:rketable title.'' 
The covenant to convey title by statutory form of 
"·arrant deed amounts to a covenant to give "a good 
and sufficient deed," which necessarily implies that title 
shall be marketable. 
In the case at bar the contract provides that the 
plaintiffs will execute and deliver to the buyers or assigns 
a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title 
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to the above described premises free and clear of all 
encumbrances, so that in this case the plaintiffs warrant 
a marketable title. 
In the case of otewart Livestock Company v. Ostler, 
supra, the Court said: 
"The covenant to convey title by statutory form 
of warranty deed amounts to a covenant to give 
• a good and sufficient title', which necessarily 
implies the title shall be marketable.'' 
Upon the question of what constitutes marketability, 
the Court, in the case of Aye~rs v. Graff, 153 Kan. 209; 
109 Pac. (2d) 202, ·states the rule as follows: 
"The title to realty need not be bad in fact to 
render it 'nonmerchantable', but it is sufficient 
if an ordinarily prudent man with knowledge 
of facts and aware of legal questions involved 
would not accept it in ordinary course of busi-
ness.'' 
Title to real property is unmarketable if it is depend-
ent upon judicial proceedings which are jurisdictionally 
defective. 57 A.L.R. 1460 citing Re Safe Deposit & Trust 
Company, 125 ~r[d. 519, 94 Atl. 93, 
"holding that a title is not marketable where it 
is dependent upon a deed issued in a proceeding 
for collection of a delinquent tax and the 
statutory requirement that notice of sale shall 
be served upon the owners has not been com-
plied with.'' 
The Court said in the case of Ca.p.arell v. G'ood'body, 
132 N. J. Eq. 559; 29 Atl. (2d) 563, 574: 
''As early as 187 4 our Chancellor conformally 
stated: 'The Court will never compel a pur-
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chaser to take a title where the point on which 
it depends is too doubtful to be settled without 
litigation, or where the purchase would expose 
him to the hazard of such proceedings; or, as 
it is usually expressed, it will not compel him to 
buy a law suit. That may be a good title at law 
which a court of equity in the exercise of its 
discretionary power, will not force on an unwill-
ing purchaser. Every purchaser of land has a 
right to demand a title which shall put him 
in all reasonable security, and which shall pro-
tect him from anxiety, lest annoying, if not suc-
cessful, suits be brought against him and prob-
ably take from him or his representatives, land 
upon which money is invested. He should have 
a title which shall enable him not only to hold 
his land, but to hold it in peace; and if he wishes 
to sell it, to be reasonably sure that no flaw or 
doubt will come up to disturb its marketable 
value.'' 
POINT TWO 
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT CON-
TRARY TO LAW AND IS THE CORRECT DECISION UNDER 
THE RULES OF EQUITY. 
Appellants complain that they should have been 
allowed to clear the title if the defects were of such a 
nature that they could be cleared and cite the case of 
Sabin v~Rauch, 75 Ariz. 275; 255 Pac. (2d) 206 to support 
this point. There is considerable law upon this point. 
But an examination of the cases will disclose that almost 
invariably the purchaser has been in possession of the 
property when the Court has allowed the seller time 
within which to quiet title to his lands. In the case of 
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Sabin Y. Rauch, supra, the purchaser was in possession. 
In this ea~e the respondent has never been in possession 
of the lands. 
The matter of allowing the vendor to perfect his 
title is discussed in 49 Am. J ur. Sec. 103, Page 121. Fol-
lowing is the text: 
· • Subsequent Perfection of Vendor's Title; Allow-
ance of Reasonable time to Perfect. One who 
contracts to convey an estate which he does not 
own at the time, may, if he afterward becomes 
the owner, be compelled to perform the contract 
and convey the land ; and on the other hand, 
the vendor may, if able to make good title at 
the time stipulated, compel specific performance 
by the purchaser and recover the agreed con-
sideration. Where time is not of the essence of 
a contract for the sale of land, a decree of speci-
fic performance will be rendered altho the title 
was not perfected at the time the contract of 
sale was made or at the time of the suit for 
specific performance was filed, if it appears that 
the title is perfected at the time the decree is 
rendered. If the vendor is unable to make 
good title at the time stipulated or at the time 
of trial, it is within the discretion of the Court 
to allow the vendor a reasonable time to perfect 
his title and compel the purchaser to accept it, 
providing time is not of the essence of the con-
tract and it can be done without hardship or 
injustice to the vendee. This rule applies 
especially where the vendee entered into the 
contract knowing of the vendor's title * * * "'. 
Usually in order to secure additional time for 
perfecting his title, the vendor must ask the 
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court for such favor; ordinarily it will not be 
granted where he goes to trial asserting good 
title which is denied by the defendant. The fact 
that the vendor did not have good and merchant-
able title at the time the contract of sale was 
executed, and doe~ not have such title at the 
time the ~mit for specific performance is insti-
tuted will, however, along with other circum-
stances, sometimes cause a court to refuse to 
grant specific performance.'' 
In this case the respondent did not know of the 
defects in the appellants' title at the time the contract was 
executed. The appellant~ did not ask the Court for addi-
tional time within which to perfect their title. The 
appellants went to trial, as~-;erting good title, which was 
denied by the respondent. The trial Court, in the exer-
cise of a sound discretion, properly ruled in favor of the 
respondent. 
The following from 55 Am. Jur. Sec. 281, page 725, 
is in point on the matter of the possession of the prop-
erty: 
"Many of the ca·ses which have held that a vendee 
cannot, prior to the time set for conveyance, 
complain of defects in the vendor's title, have 
predicated that ruling in part upon the circum-
stance of the vendee's being in possession of the 
premises. 
The appellant:-:; complain that they should have been 
permitted to furnish a policy of title insurance in lieu 
of a marketable title and quote a provision of the contract 
(page 25 of appellants' brief) to the effect that the ·sellers 
may furnish an abstract of title or policy of title insur-
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anc.e. The appellants did not tender a title insurance 
policy. HoweYer, the appellants are in error in their 
position that the respondent contracted to accept a title 
policy in lieu of a marketable title. A careful reading 
of the provisions of the contract as set forth at page 25 
of the ~\.ppellants' Brief will disclose that the sellers 
agreed to deliver a good and sufficient warranty deed, 
which, as heretofore discussed, implies a marketable-title. 
In addition, the sellers agreed to either furnish an 
abstract of title or a policy of title insurance. There is 
nothing in the contract which states that the buyer shall 
accept a policy of title insurance in lieu of a marketable 
title. It only provides that the sellers may furnish a 
policy of title insurance in lieu of an abstract. 
As di,scussed at length hereinafter, the matter of 
decreeing specific performance of a contract is largely 
a matter of discretion in the trial Court. Under the facts 
and law as hereinbefore set forth, the trial Court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to decree ,specific 
performance of the eon tract in this ease. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING TO 
MAKE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT UPON 
THE ALLEGATION OF THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER 
THAT THE APPELLANTS REPRESENTED TO THE RE-
SPONDENT THAT THE FARM CONTAINED 170 ACRES 
OF CULTIVATED LAND INSTEAD OF 108 ACRES AND IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
REPRESENTED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TRANSACTION 
WAS NOT ALL INCLUDED THEREIN AND IN FAILING 
TO MAKE AND ENTER CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND A 
DECREE IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT IN THE EX-
ERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION BECAUSE OF SUCH 
REPRESENTATIONS. 
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A~ shown by the evidence set forth under the state-
ment ol' l'ad~ in thi~s brief, Fred Gagan represented that 
all pP r~onal property except hand tools, a hay baler, and 
plaintil'l':-~' JH·rslmal effects would go to the purchaser 
and that tlt<~n~ \\'ere 170 acres of land under cultivation. 
Relying upon the:-~1· representations, Mr. Allen executed 
the agreement to purchase. He expected to receive one-
fourth of the oil rights, all of the personal property upon 
the farn1 except hand tools, a hay baler, plaintiffs' per-
sonal effects and his automobile, and a farm containing 
170 acres under cultivation. As he testified, he would not 
have entered into the contract if he had known that 
there were only 108 acres under cultivation (Tr. 59). 
It matters not that the mi~stake as to the amount 
of land under cultivation or the amount of personal 
property involved in the tranaction was induced by Mr. 
Gagan rather than by the plaintiff himself. The fact 
that the contract as written, if specifically enforced, 
would not give to ~fr. Allen what he thought he was 
buying would make it inequitable to enforce the contract. 
There is also anoher n1atter. Under the contract Mt. 
Allen was to receive one-fourth of the oil rights in the 
391 acres. Although this fact does not appear in the 
abstract (plaintiffs' Exhibit "D"), Mr. Allen has a 
letter from the abstracter to the effect that there is 
an error in the abstract and particularly at Entry 12 
thereof. Entry 12 should show that the Government 
reserved all oil rights in and to the 160 acres described 
therein. The fact that Mr. Woodard knows that he does 
not own these oil rights is inferentially shown at Entry 
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80, an oil and gas lease from the \V oodards to Carter 
Oil Company of all their lands except this 160 acres. 
Also, as shown on Entry 78 of Exhibit "D,'' the Wood-
ards g·ave a mineral deed to Paul E. Nelson for an 
undivided interest in and to the rest of the lands owned 
by the """ oodards, but particularly omitting the 160 
acres mentioned in Entry 12. 
So that the Court is not only justified in refusing 
specific perfonnance as a nmtter of discretion, but 
should, as a matter of right to the defendant, refuse 
specific performance where the number of acres under 
cultivation, the amount of personal property, market-
ability of the title and the amount of oil rights stand as 
they do in this case. 
The matter of decreeing specific perfo1mance of a 
contract is largely a matter of discretion in the trial 
Court. The rule is stated and annotated with numerous 
cases in 81 C.J.S., Sec. 9, page 417, as follows: 
''Discretion of Court. a. In General. As a gen-
eral rule, the specific performance of a con-
tract by a court of equity is not a matter of 
absolute right in the parties demanding it, ·but 
the grant of specific performance is a matter 
of grace, and applications for such relief :are 
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. 
The grant of specific performance is a matter 
for the Court's discretion and not of right, 
although a legal contract is shown to exist, the 
terms of which are clear, certain and unambigu-
ous even where the contract was entered into 
' fairly and honestly without the presence of 
fraud. It has been held that the remedy is dis-
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cretionary even with respect to contracts in 
which the remedy is ordinarily invoked, and 
even though a legal right to damages for a 
breach of contract may exist. 
''b. Limitation on Discretion. Under the general 
rule that specific performance is a discretionary 
remedy, the discretion of the Court is subject 
to limitations. It is not an arbitrary or eaprici-
ous discretion, nor a personal one, but a sound, 
judicial or legal discretion, controlled and reg-
ulated by established usages and principles of 
equity; and relief is to be granted or denied 
according to the circumstances of each partic-
ular case, on knowledge of the whole facts and 
on full consideration of all the rights involved. 
These established equitable principles are said to 
be advisory rather than mandatory, the appli-
cation of the rules and their exceptions to each 
particular case being intrusted to the conscience 
of the Qourt which must be guided by them.'' 
The following from Pomeroy's Equity, Third Edi-
tion, is in point: 
''Section 860, page 1516. The second class of 
cases embraces those in which parol evidence of 
mistake is offered defensively. The equitable 
remedy of the specific enforcement of contracts, 
even when they are valid and binding at law, 
is not a matter of course ; it is so completely 
g·overned by equitable considerations that it is 
sometimes, though improperly, called discre-
tionary; it is never granted unless it is entirely 
in accordance with equity and good conscience. 
It is therefore ·a well-settled rule, that in suits 
for the specific enforcement of agreements, even 
when written, the defendant may by means of 
parol evidence show that, through a mistake 
of both or either of the parties, the· writing does 
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not express the real agreement, or that the 
agreetnent itself was entered into through a 
mistake as to it::-~ subject n1atter or as to its 
terms. In short, a court of equity will not grant 
its affirn1ative remedy to compel the defendant 
to perform a contract which he did not intend 
to make or which he would not have entered 
into had its true effect been under·stood. What 
is thus true of mistake is equally true of a 
defense based upon fraud or surprise. Wherever 
the defendant's mistake was, either intention-
ally or not, induced, or m·ade probable or even 
possible, by the acts of omissions of the plain-
tiff, then, on the plainest principles of justice, 
such error prevents a specific enforcement of 
the agreement. Such co-operation by the plain-
tiff, however, is not at all essential. A mistake 
which is entirely the defendant's own, or that 
of his agent, and for which the plaintiff is not 
directly or indirectly responsible, may be proved 
in defense, and may defeat a specific perform-
ance. This is indeed the very essence of the 
equitable theory concerning the nature and 
effect of mistake. A mistake thus set up by the . 
defendant is not merely a ground of defense, 
(but) of dismissing the suit.'' 
In a very recent case before the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina, facts similar to those involved in this 
case were before the Court for consideration. In the case 
of Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199 S. C. 5; 18 S. E. (2d), 
584, the facts were so similar and the law so applicable 
that defendant desires to quote at length from that case. 
In that case, the plaintiff, through a real estate 
agent, Baldwin, entered into a contract for the sale of 
certain real property to the defendant. Baldwin, without 
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the knowledge ol' the plaintiff, represented to the de-
fendant that the rentals of the property were $3,680.00 
per year, when in fact they were less than $2,000.00, and 
represented that the taxes and insurance were $300.00, 
when in fact they were over $700.00. The matter was 
tried to a special referee, who concluded that the defend-
ant had failed to avail himself of the means at hand to 
ascertain the true facts and could not be heard to say 
that he wa~ deceived by the misrepresentations of Bald-
win. The Special Referee ruled in favor of the plaintiff 
and the Circuit Court adopted the finding of the Referee. 
The defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court on 
two grounds, one of which was that it would he inequi-
table to decree specific performance in the matter. The 
following are quotations from that case: 
"It is well settled that specific performance is 
not a matter of absolute right, but rests in 
the sound discretion of the court, guided by 
established principles, and is exercised by a con-
sideration of all the circumstances of each par-
ticular case. A Court of Equity will not decree 
specific performance unless the contract is fair, 
just and equitable, nor if it fails to express the 
true agreement of the parties by reason of 
fraud, accident or mistake. 
"At 58 C. J. 965 it is said 'As a general rule, if 
defendant has been induced to make the con-
tract by reason of any material misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the plaintiff or hi's agent, 
specific performance will be denied, whether the 
misrepresentation was wilful and intended, or 
made innocently or with an honest belief in its 
truth * * * ' 
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"Equity may deny specific perfonnance because 
of misrepresentations in procuring a contract, 
when it would not rescind the agreement at the 
in~tance of the injured party * * * 
''It is ~tated in the case of G'asque v. Small, 21 
S. C. Eq. 72, that: 'There is a material differ-
ence between a party who seeks to rescind and 
one who seeks to enforce an agreement, as it 
requires much stronger evidence to effect the 
former, than will be sufficient to enable the 
defendant to resist the latter. 
"In laying great weight upon the failure of Ebert 
to make a more complete investigation, we think 
that the Special Referee and the Learned Circuit 
Judge have a~plied the principles relating to 
rescission of contracts, rather than those govern-
ing specific performance. It is true, however, 
that Ebert is not seeking a rescission of a con-
tract; he is defending an action for specific per-
formance brought by the seller. Even if we 
assume that if the defendant had sought a rescis-
sion of the contract, the court would have re-
fused it, it does not necessarily follow that ,speci-
fic performance should be granted. 
''It is not so much a question of diligence of Ebert 
in investigating the representations, as it is a 
proper application of the ancient maxim that 
he who comes into equity must come with clean 
hands. For many years it has been held that the 
Court of Equity will refuse to lend its aid to 
one who has been guilty of inequitable conduct 
in the subject matter. We think that this maxim 
aptly fits the present case. The equitable status 
of the plaintiffs is the primary consideration. 
"We think that there were such misrepresenta-
tions on the part of the plaintiff, Baldwin, as 
would make it inequitable for specific perform-
ance to be granted. 
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"It is true that the false representations were not 
made by the officers of the company or by Mr. 
Wade ; they knew nothing of them. They were, 
however, made by the company's selling agent 
Baldwin, and it would not be equitable to allo~ 
the principal to have the advantage resulting 
from such misrepresentations. * * * 
One of the head notes reads : ''Generally if de-
fendant has been induced to make a contract by 
reason of material misrepresentations of the 
plaintiff, or his agent, specific performance will 
be denied whether the representation was wilful 
and intended or made innocently or with honest 
belief in its truth, and even though there existed 
and were accessible to defendant the means and 
opportunity of detecting the truth by ordinary 
prudence, or although defendant had gone so 
far as to make a partial investigation without 
discovering the truth.'' 
Another rna tter which should appeal to the discretion 
of the Court in this case is the fact that the respondent 
and Mr. Woodard rescinded the contract. It is true that 
no evidence was introduced to the effect that Mrs. Wood-
ard rescinded the contract and the defendant confesses 
that the law is that all parties to the contract Inust assent 
to a rescission or abrogation. However, Mrs. Woodard 
apparently had nothing to do with the transaction except 
to sign a document or two. As a necessary allegation of 
the plaintiffs' complaint, they allege that the plaintiff's 
(both of them) were at all times ready, able and willing 
to perform the contract. In. plaintiffs' brief they state 
that the plaintiff, Mr. Woodard, testified that he and his 
wife had always been ready and willing to perform the 
operations required of them under the contract (page 14 
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of appellant's brief). A reading of the transcript of evi-
dence discloses that l\Ir. \Yoodard ,,~as speaking for him-
self and not for i\Ir::;. Woodard when he gave the evidence 
set forth in Tr. 36 on this matter. It is noteworthy that 
.Jlrs. Woodard did not take the stand, so that we have 
no evidence as to whether or not :Mrs. Woodard consented 
to the rescission by :Mr. Woodard. However, it may be 
inferred that she knew that others were looking at the 
property, and that efforts were being made to sell the 
property to others after Mr. vVoodard had rescinded 
and abandoned the contract. 
Respondent submits that the decree rendered by the 
trial court was amply supported by the evidence and was 
in accordance with law. Respondent further submits 
that the trial Court should have found in favor of the 
respondent upon the matter of representations made by 
the appellants' agent, Gagan, which were not true and on 
that ground ruled in respondent's favor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON, 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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